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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
No.07-3642
_________
RONALD MASH,
trading as
EAGLE MASONRY
v.
TOWNSHIP OF HAVERFORD DEPARTMENT OF CODES ENFORCEMENT; LORI
HANLON, Widdop Department of Codes Enforcement of Haverford Township;
DAVID COOPER, Code Enforcement Officer, Haverford Township;
STEPHEN D'EMILLO, President of the Haverford Township Commissioners;
ROBERT E. TRUNBULL, 3rd Ward Commissioner; FRED C. MORAN,
4th Ward Commissioner; JOHN CAPUZZI, 5th Ward Commissioner;
LARRY HOLMES, 6th Ward Commissioner; JAMES E. MCGARRITY, 7th Ward
Commissioner; TOM BROIDO, 8th Ward Commissioner; CAROL A. MCDONALD,
9th Ward Commissioner
Ronald Mash,
Appellant
___________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No.06-cv-04479
( The Honorable L. Felipe Restrepo) 
___________________
2Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 11, 2008 
Before: McKEE, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 30, 2008 ) 
OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Ronald Mash appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the court’s denial of his motion for partial summary judgment that was based on
the contention that he is entitled to attorneys fees because he is the “prevailing party.”   For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts or
procedural history of this case except insofar as may be helpful to our brief discussion. 
In order to establish a claim under § 1988, Mash must prove a deprivation of a “right
secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under the
color of state law.”  Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996).  Mash argues that he is
the prevailing party in his civil rights suit because the Township’s Board of Commissioners
refused to schedule a hearing on the appeal of his permit denial until he filed this civil rights
action.  Mash’s argument is based on the “catalyst” theory, whereby a plaintiff is entitled to
 Pursuant to the OPEN Government Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(A)(4)(E)(ii) (2008), it is no longer necessary to show that1
the material alteration of the parties’ position has the ‘judicial imprimatur.’ Even though the wording of the statute
has been changed by amendment, we need not consider the impact here, because the change was enacted after Mash
filed this appeal and Mash does not argue it should be applied in his complaint. 
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attorney’s fees if his/her suit was a “catalyst for the vindication of his constitutional rights.” 
Staten v. Housing Auth., 638 F.2d 599, 605 (3d Cir. 1980).  However, in Buckhannon v. West
Virginia, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a “defendant’s voluntary change in
conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change[,]” to support a claim that a plaintiff is a
prevailing party.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.  The Court thus rejected the “catalyst” theory
that Mash’s claim rests upon. Id.   Under the Buckhannon rule, Mash can not establish that he is1
a prevailing party.  Therefore, this record does not support his claim that he is entitled to
attorney’s fees. 
Mash additionally argues that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
defendants was based on “facts not of record,” because the court erroneously thought that he was
asserting improper retaliation for his earlier suit against some of the defendants.  Mash asserts
that the First Amended Complaint that was before the court did not allege retaliation for his 2002
suit that he brought under Pennsylvania’s “Right to Know” law.  Rather, argues Mash, that claim
was in a subsequent Amended Complaint that he was never allowed to file. 
Although the district court denied Mash’s requests for a second and third Amended
Complaint specifically alleging improper retaliation, his attack on the district court’s denial of his
motion for partial summary judgment ignores the fact that he raised the issue of retaliation for his
4prior “Right to Know” lawsuit in oral argument as the basis for the defendant’s alleged
retaliatory acts against him.  See Supp. App. at 5, 11-12, 22
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Mash only raised the 2002 retaliation facts in the
complaints that he was not allowed to file, the district court did not err because it would have
been futile to allow the proffered amended complaints.  A court does not err in refusing to allow
an amendment to a complaint, where the amendment does not cure the problem with the initial
complaint.  See Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413-14 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Foman v.
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (explaining that under F.R.C.P. 15(a), in the absence of undue
prejudice to nonmoving party, denial of amendment must be based on bad faith, dilatory motives,
truly undue delay, failure to cure deficiency or futility of amendment) (emphasis added)). 
The district court correctly reasoned that even assuming that Mash’s assertions were true,
the record did not allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the defendants were liable
because Mash’s many allegations were not supported by the record.  Accordingly, the district
court was correct in granting summary judgment to the defendants, and in denying Mash’s
motion for partial summary judgment. 
 II. 
For all of the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s denial of Mash’s Partial
Motion for Summary Judgment and affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants. 
